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I
W
I 
“While we may be uneasy about what lies ahead, we must be bold, imaginative and re-
sourceful, aware of the promises as well as the perils of the unknown.”1 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
    
   t could be said that every war in human history has its own signature sound. 
The pounding of marching boots—World War I. The unique “woo woo” 
noise of the Luftwaffe formations, or perhaps the deafening blast of the 
atomic bomb explosion—World War II. The whirl of helicopter blades—
Vietnam War. And so on. However, there are no molecules of air to carry 
sound waves in the vacuum of outer space. Therefore, it may well be that 
space warfare is the first type of war whose signature sound would be—
silence. 
But does the looming threat of a Silent War portend the need to revisit 
Cicero’s dictum that inter arma enim silent leges (“in times of war, the law falls 
silent”)?2 While it is questionable whether that adage has ever been accurate,3 
it is manifestly untrue today; at least insofar as terrestrial conflict is con-
cerned.4 Perhaps, however, the timeless silence of the cosmos forebodes a 
different conclusion when it comes to war in outer space. 
                                                                                                                      
1. Kenneth B. Keating, The Law and the Conquest of Space, 25 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND 
COMMERCE 182, 192 (1958). 
2. CICERO, PRO MILONE 16 (N.H. Watts trans., Harvard Univ. Press 5th ed. 1972) (52 
B.C.). 
3. See, e.g., JOHN KEEGAN, WAR AND OUR WORLD 26 (2001) (“Even in the age of total 
warfare when, as in Cicero’s day, war was considered a normal condition . . . there remained 
taboos, enshrined in law and thankfully widely observed.”). 
4. See, e.g., GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 16 (2d ed. 2016) (“In time of 
war the laws are silent? Perhaps in Cicero’s time, but not today. The many multinational 
treaties bearing on battlefield conduct and the protection of the victims of armed conflict 
demonstrate that there is a large and growing body of positive law, IHL, bearing on armed 
conflict.”); HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel 
62(1) PD 507, ¶ 61 (2006) (Isr.), reprinted in 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373 
(“The saying ‘when the cannons roar, the muses are silent’ is well known. A similar idea was 
expressed by Cicero, who said: ‘during war, the laws are silent’ (silent enim legis inter arma). 
Those sayings are regrettable. They reflect neither the existing law nor the desirable law . . . 
.”). 
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We are now just over six decades into the “Space Age,” which began in 
October 1957 with the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik.5 In the succeed-
ing sixty years, an all-out armed conflict in space has fortunately remained 
confined to the realm of science fiction. However, hopeful post-Sputnik pre-
dictions that “satellites would have no practical military application in the 
foreseeable future”6 were rapidly disproven by advancements in science and 
technology.7 
The 1991 Gulf War is sometimes dubbed the “First Space War,” because 
of the extensive U.S. use of its satellite capabilities during that conflict.8 Since 
then, the military potential, as well as the actual military uses of space assets, 
has steadily grown.9 Over the past few decades, several State space powers 
have demonstrated their ability to conduct kinetic attacks against satellites in 
orbit,10 sometimes with dramatic effects as seen in the Chinese satellite in-
tercept test in 2007.11 More recently, speculation has arisen as to the potential 
                                                                                                                      
5. The probable first use of the term can be traced back to a front-page headline in the 
London Daily Express the day after Sputnik was launched. Space Age Is Here, DAILY EXPRESS 
(London), Oct. 5, 1957, at 1. 
6. William J. Jorden, Soviet Fires Earth Satellite into Space, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 5, 1957, 
at 1. 
7. See, e.g., National Security Council Planning Board, U.S. Policy on Outer Space ¶¶ 15 
and 19 (June 20, 1958), http://marshall.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2013 
/09/NSC-5814-Preliminary-U.S.-Policy-on-Outer-Space-18-Aug-1958.pdf (“Any use of 
outer space . . . may have some degree of military or other non-peaceful application. . . . The 
effective use of outer space by the United States and the Free World will enhance their 
military capability.”); Central Intelligence Agency, US Military Space Activities ¶ 3 (United 
States Delegation to the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Position 
Paper, Mar. 14, 1962), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP66R00 
638R00 0100150082-7.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Military Space Activities] 
The US is engaged in a broadly-based outer space effort . . . . In conducting this effort we 
are drawing on the resources of our defense agencies as well as those of our civilian space 
agency. As far as we know, the Soviet space program also draws on military support. 
8. Peter Anson & Dennis Cummings, The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to 
the Gulf War, 136 THE RUSI JOURNAL 45 (1991). 
9. See, e.g., JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, CROWDED ORBITS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN 
SPACE 121–46 (2014). 
10. DAVID WRIGHT, LAURA GREGO & LISBETH GRONLUND, THE PHYSICS OF SPACE 
SECURITY: A REFERENCE MANUAL 135–38 (2005). 
11. China Confirms Satellite Downed, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk 
/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6289519.stm. 
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of some States to engage in hostile on-orbit proximity operations.12 Outer 
space has become essential to modern warfare and the military forces of all 
major powers now rely on space assets to fulfil their functions.13 
All these developments underline the urgency of understanding the ex-
tent to which the existing law of armed conflict—the jus in bello—applies to 
military space operations. This is certainly not just a matter of academic cu-
riosity. As Richard Baxter, a leading twentieth-century U.S. international law 
expert, warned, “[t]he first line of defense against [the jus in bello] is to deny 
that it applies at all.”14 Similarly, George Aldrich, his contemporary, observed 
that when States refuse to apply the Geneva Conventions, they often justify 
such refusals by the “differences between the conflicts presently encoun-
tered and those for which the conventions were supposedly adopted.”15 In 
order to foster compliance with the law, we must therefore understand its 
remit, including in situations unforeseen by its creators. 
Serious doubts have been raised in the relevant literature as to the ap-
plicability of the jus in bello to military operations in space. It has been sug-
gested that the uniqueness of the space environment means that “it cannot 
be held beforehand that the corpus of the [jus in bello] applies in toto to armed 
conflict in outer void space.”16 Moreover, scholars have argued that customary 
principles of this body of law “are probably neither sufficiently specific nor 
entirely appropriate for military action in outer space,”17 and that, conversely, 
                                                                                                                      
12. See, e.g., Subrata Ghoshroy, The X-37B: Backdoor weaponization of space?, 71 BULLETIN 
OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 19, 22 (2015) (suggesting the U.S. spaceplane X-37B may be 
capable of “making a rendezvous with another craft” and of doing “in-orbit maneuvers to 
spy on other satellites”); Laurence Peter, Russia Shrugs Off US Anxiety over Military Satellite, 
BBC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34581089 (report-
ing an incident in which a Russian military satellite moved to within ten kilometers of an 
Intelsat satellite). 
13. MOLTZ, supra note 9, at 172–173. 
14. Richard Baxter, Some Existing Problems in Humanitarian Law, in THE CONCEPT OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: FURTHER OUTLOOK 1–2 (Claude Pilloud ed., 1974). 
15. George Aldrich, Human Rights and Armed Conflict: Conflicting Views, 67 AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 141, 142 (1973). 
16. Arjen Vermeer, The Laws of War in Outer Space: Some Legal Implications for the Jus ad 
Bellum and the Jus in Bello of the Militarisation and Weaponisation of Outer Space, in THE NEW 
ORDER OF WAR 69, 74 (Bob Brecher ed., 2010). 
17. Steven Freeland, The Laws of War in Outer Space, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE SECURITY 
81, 102 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Peter L. Hays, Jana Robinson, Denis Moura & Christina Gian-
nopapa eds., 2015). 
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“it is at least arguable that no conventional international law regulates [military] 
activities” in outer space.18  
This article addresses the uncertainty at the heart of this issue in a com-
prehensive and systematic way. At the outset, it lays down the conceptual 
framework for this inquiry by examining the factual notion of “military space 
operations,” their relationship with the legal concept of “armed conflict,” 
and the overall scope of the potentially applicable bodies of law (Part II). It 
then explores whether there are any general reasons that would preclude the 
applicability of the jus in bello to military space operations (Part III). These 
reasons are the Lotus objection, that is, the claim that without a specific rule 
extending the jus in bello to space, States remain unconstrained in their mili-
tary activities (III.A); the peaceful purposes objection that outer space, as a 
domain reserved for peaceful exploration, is beyond the reach of the law that 
governs armed conflict (III.B), and the source-specific challenges posed by 
international treaties and customary international law (III.C). Finally, Part IV 
considers the four specific dimensions of applicability of the jus in bello—
material, personal, temporal, and geographic. It thus examines situations in-
volving military space operations in which the law may apply (IV.A); which 
persons are covered by its provisions, with a special focus on the status of 
military astronauts (IV.B); what challenges are posed by the temporal speci-
ficities of some space operations (IV.C), and whether the law should be seen 
as geographically constrained (IV.D).  
It should be noted that the focus on the threshold question of applica-
bility has meant that a number of issues had to remain outside the scope of 
the present analysis. This is the case with regard to the follow-up question 
of how specific jus in bello rules apply to real or hypothetical space opera-
tions.19 Similarly, there is no discussion of the practical application of space 
assets to further the goals of the jus in bello in a terrestrial context, such as 
                                                                                                                      
18. William Boothby, Does the Law of Targeting Meet Twenty-First-Century Needs?, in CON-
TEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAWS OF WAR: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR PE-
TER ROWE 216, 224 (Caroline Harvey, James Summers & Nigel D. White eds., 2014) (em-
phasis added). 
19. To some extent, these questions are addressed by other contributions to this sym-
posium. See Bill Boothby, Space Weapons and the Law, 93 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 179 
(2017); Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Neutrality and Outer Space, 93 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 526 (2017); Dale Stephens, The International Legal Implications of Military Space Opera-
tions: Examining the Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and the Outer Space Regime, 
94 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES (forthcoming 2018). 
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documenting violations of the law20 or supporting humanitarian action dur-
ing armed conflict.21 
 
II. SPACE OPERATIONS AT THE INTERSECTION OF FACTS AND LAW 
 
The scope of the present inquiry is shaped by factual as well as legal consid-
erations. First, there is the factual question of the content of the eponymous 
term “military space operations.” This concept (and its derivations) is de-
fined in various ways in the literature,22 and the line between military and 
non-military activities in outer space is notoriously blurry. As early as 1961, 
it was observed that “[v]irtually every activity in space has a possible military 
connotation; military and nonmilitary uses are extraordinarily interdepend-
ent.”23  
In this article, “military space operation” means any type of military ac-
tion, including, but not limited to, acts of violence against the adversary, 
                                                                                                                      
20. See, e.g., Joshua Lyons, Documenting Violations of International Humanitarian Law From 
Space: A Critical Review of Geospatial Analysis of Satellite Imagery During Armed Conflicts in Gaza 
(2009), Georgia (2008), and Sri Lanka (2009), 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 739 (2012). 
21. See, e.g., Krystal Wilson, Why Outer Space Matters: Krystal Wilson on Humanitarian Uses 
of Space, INTERCROSS BLOG (Oct. 18, 2016), http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/why-outer-
space-matters-krystal-wilson-on-humanitarian-uses-of-space.  
22. See, e.g., JOHN J. KLEIN, SPACE WARFARE: STRATEGY, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY 7 
(2006) (“Military space activities are those promoting national security through offensive or 
defensive operations—whether from, into, or through space.”); Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, Space Operations, at II-1 (2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doc-
trine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf (“US military space operations are composed of the following 
mission areas: space situational awareness, space force enhancement, space support, space 
control, and space force application.”); Are We Losing the Space Race to China, Hearing Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Space of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 108th Cong. 46 (2016) (state-
ment of Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow for Chinese Political and Security Affairs, 
The Heritage Foundation), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=796740, citing JIANG LIANJU, 
SPACE OPERATIONS TEACHING MATERIALS 126–54 (2013) (“PLA analysts believe that mil-
itary space operations are likely to entail five broad styles (yangshi) or mission areas: space 
deterrence, space blockades, space strike operations, space defense operations, and provi-
sion of space information support.”). 
23. Leon Lipson & Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, The Law of Outer Space, in LEGAL PROB-
LEMS OF SPACE EXPLORATION: A SYMPOSIUM 806 (Legislative Reference Service, Library 
of Congress ed., 1961). 
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which have a material connection to outer space.24 This space nexus may 
take at least four main forms:25 (1) military operations in space, such as on-
orbit proximity operations;26 (2) military operations from space, such as (for 
the time being hypothetical) “orbital bombs,” sometimes also referred to as 
the “rods from God;”27 (3) military operations to space, such as the launching 
of kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles28 and (4) military operations through 
space, such the employment of long-range missiles that transit through outer 
space en route to their target.29 The notion of material connection to space 
also covers the use of space assets necessary to support or enable military 
activities on earth.30 
Second, there is the issue of the meeting of the facts and the law regard-
ing the link between the factual phenomenon of military space operations 
and the legal notion of armed conflict. The existence of an armed conflict—
or, more precisely, of either an international armed conflict (IAC) or a non-
                                                                                                                      
24. This definition is based on the concept of “military operations,” a term used 
throughout Additional Protocol I and elsewhere, as being broader than “attacks.” See, e.g., 
MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS 
OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 408 (1982) (“‘Military operations’ as used in Pro-
tocol I involve both fire and movement. The thrust of the term ‘attack’ . . . deals with the fire 
aspect of the operation, not necessarily the movement part.”) (emphasis in original). 
25. For a similar classification of “space weapons,” see Duncan Blake, Military Strategic 
Use of Outer Space, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 97, 108–11 
(Hitoshi Nasu & Robert McLaughlin eds., 2014). 
26. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
27. See, e.g., INDEPENDENT WORKING GROUP ON MISSILE DEFENSE, THE SPACE RE-
LATIONSHIP, & THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 2009 REPORT, at 86 (2009), http://www.if 
pa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf; see also WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 10, at 6–7 
(arguing that the combination of relatively high cost and low reliability makes space assets 
poorly suited for kinetic attacks against ground targets). 
28. See, e.g., William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, China Tests Anti-Satellite Weapon, Un-
nerving U.S., NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01 
/18/world/asia/18cnd-china.html (reporting on a Chinese ASAT weapons test); Thom 
Shanker, Missile Strikes a Spy Satellite Falling from Its Orbit, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, 
at A15 (reporting on a U.S. ASAT weapons test). 
29. See John E. Shaw, The Influence of Space Power upon History 1944–1998, 46 AIR POWER 
HISTORY 20, 23 (1999) (noting that “the ICBM was the first weapon designed to travel into 
and through space”). 
30. See, e.g., U.K. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Military Uses of 
Outer Space, at 1 (Dec. 2006), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/postpn273.pdf 
(noting that space assets “are widely used to provide support for military or security related 
activities . . .  [and] increasingly used to provide direct support for military operations”). 
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international armed conflict (NIAC)—is a precondition for the applicability 
of the jus in bello.31 Accordingly, a military space operation may either (1) oc-
cur within an existing armed conflict, or (2) be undertaken during peacetime, 
with different consequences for the interplay between the facts and the law.  
If the former, the operation would complement or augment an existing state 
of hostilities, which might otherwise lack a material connection to space. In 
that case, the relevant legal question is whether the law of armed conflict 
applies to the military space operation just as it would to “ordinary” earth-
based (“terrestrial”) conduct. For instance, targeting of objects on the 
ground frequently relies on precision timing and navigation provided by sat-
ellites.32 The question then is to what extent—if at all—the existing law reg-
ulates the space segment of the operation.33 
By contrast, if an operation takes place in time of peace, the key question 
of law (for the purposes of this article) is whether that operation would by 
itself trigger the applicability of the jus in bello. For example, the near-future 
sci-fi novel Ghost Fleet foresees a high-power laser attack from a space station 
controlled by one State against the space assets of another State.34 Would 
such a scenario bring about an IAC between the two States?35  
Third, there is the purely legal question of the scope of the applicable 
law. The Latin term jus in bello is often translated into English as the law of 
war, which is, in turn, sometimes taken also to extend to matters concerning 
the law on the use of force.36 However, I have refrained from analyzing ques-
tions of the jus ad bellum,37 focusing solely on the jus in bello, which is under-
                                                                                                                      
31. Jann K. Kleffner, Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 43, 43–44 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013). 
32. See, e.g., WRIGHT, GREGO & GRONLUND, supra note 10, at 165 (noting the use of 
the U.S.-developed Global Positioning System for guidance of precision munitions).  
33. Answer: In principle, the space segment is governed by the jus in bello just as much 
as the ground segment. See infra Section IV.D. 
34. PETER W. SINGER & AUGUST COLE, GHOST FLEET: A NOVEL OF THE NEXT 
WORLD WAR 44–47 (2015). The main text is intentionally vague to avoid any major spoilers. 
35. Answer: Yes, it would. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
36. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 1.3 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD MANUAL]. 
37. In doing so, the analysis observes the “cardinal principle that jus in bello applies in 
cases of armed conflict whether or not the inception of the conflict is lawful under jus ad 
bellum.” Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, Introduction to DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 
1 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000). 
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stood in simple terms as the law that “defines what is legal in armed con-
flicts.”38 It is also called international humanitarian law or the law of armed 
conflict, but for reasons of consistency jus in bello will be used throughout 
this article.39 
The jus in bello contains hundreds, perhaps thousands, of conventional 
and customary rules. The central position among the long list of applicable 
treaties40 belongs to the 1907 Hague Conventions (and particularly the so-
called Hague Regulations annexed to the fourth Hague Convention41) and 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions,42 together with their two Additional Proto-
cols of 1977.43 A compilation of applicable customary rules was published in 
2005 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),44 which has 
maintained an updated version accessible as an online database.45 
Although the focus of the discussion is on the jus in bello, the analysis 
would not be complete without consideration of the body of law that has 
been developed specifically for outer space, typically referred to as the law 
                                                                                                                      
38. Antoine Bouvier, Assessing the Relationship between Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum: An 
“Orthodox” View, 100 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 109, 
110 (2006) (emphasis omitted). 
39. See also Robert & Guelff, supra note 37, at 1–2 (discussing the various terms and 
their respective meaning). 
40. See Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/. 
41. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations]. 
42. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. 
43. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
44. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL]. The ICRC published its results in two 
volumes: volume 1 (Rules) and volume 2 (Practice). 
45. See Customary IHL Database, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home. 
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of outer space or simply space law. It consists primarily of five international 
agreements, with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty at its core.46 Importantly, the 
existing framework of space law does not comprehensively address the issue 
of military uses of outer space.47 The extent to which the rules of space law 
may affect the applicability of the jus in bello will be examined in this article; 
however, it does not dissect in detail the reverse issue of what effect the 
outbreak of hostilities may have on the peacetime law of outer space.48 
 
III. GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE JUS IN BELLO 
 
A. Lotus Objection 
 
Although several States now possess significant military space capabilities, 
the development of the law has lagged behind. None of the provisions of 
the jus in bello apply specifically to conduct in outer space.49 On the contrary, 
                                                                                                                      
46. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Agreement on 
the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched 
Into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and 
Return Agreement]; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187; Convention on Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space, June 6, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Agree-
ment governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 
1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3. 
47. An ongoing project, the development of a Manual on International Law Applicable 
to Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS), aims to respond to this need by developing 
a manual clarifying the fundamental rules applicable to such conduct in times of peace, as 
well as in armed conflict. See McGill University Launches the Manual on International Law Appli-
cable to Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS®) Project, MCGILL (May 27, 2016), 
www.mcgill.ca/milamos/files/milamos/mcgill_milamos_announcement_final_1.pdf. The 
present author is involved in the MILAMOS project as a core expert in the international 
humanitarian law research group. 
48. See Steven Freeland & Ram Jakhu, The Applicability of the United Nations Space Treaties 
during Armed Conflict, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 
157 (Rafael Moro-Aguilar, P. J. Blount & Tanja Masson-Zwaan eds., 2016). 
49. A possible singular exception is Article II of the 1977 Environmental Modification 
Convention, according to which the term “environmental modification techniques” regu-
lated by that treaty “refers to any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipu-
lation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including 
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the relevant rules use a decidedly terrestrial vocabulary. For instance, Com-
mon Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions, two provisions ordinarily 
seen as embodying the definitions of IAC and NIAC, respectively, contain 
express references to “the territory” of State Parties.50 The fact that the 1907 
Hague Regulations are limited in their scope to “war on land” is reflected in 
the title of that instrument.51 
To some extent, this is unsurprising, as many jus in bello rules have a ped-
igree that significantly predates the Space Age.52 And even the main post-
1957 recodification effort, which resulted in the adoption of the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocols, took place at a time when extending the relevant rules to 
outer space was not a priority.53 This neglect of outer space in the law of war 
had several likely causes. To a lesser degree, it was due to the fact that military 
space technology was then still in early stages of development and ground 
operations did not yet need to rely on space assets.54 However, the probable 
                                                                                                                      
its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.” Convention on the Pro-
hibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 
18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter ENMOD] (emphasis added).  
Stephens and Steer correctly note that this provision contains an “express recognition 
of the space environment.” Dale Stephens & Cassandra Steer, Conflicts in Space: International 
Humanitarian Law and its Application to Space Warfare, 40 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 71, 
80 (2015). However, the reach of the prohibitions contained in ENMOD is quite limited as 
far as conduct in outer space is concerned. The treaty only prohibits States from changing 
the outer space environment “through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes,” 
which is not a feature of any known weapons programs. See ENMOD, supra, art. I; see also 
Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 AIR FORCE 
LAW REVIEW 1, 57–58 (2000). 
50. GC I, supra note 42, arts. 2, 3; GC II, supra note 42, arts. 2, 3; GC III, supra note 42, 
arts. 2, 3; GC IV, supra note 42, arts. 2, 3. But see infra text accompanying notes 192–2013 
(analyzing these references in light of the geographical applicability of the jus in bello). 
51. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 41. 
52. See, e.g., MICHAEL SHEEHAN, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF SPACE 96 (2007). 
53. Cf. Boothby, supra note 18, at 224 n.38 (noting that “the explicit reference to outer 
space in Article II ENMOD,” which was adopted before the Additional Protocols, meant 
that the drafters of the latter instruments “must have been at least aware of the prospect of 
military operations in outer space”). 
54. See CURTIS PEEBLES, HIGH FRONTIER: THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND THE MILITARY 
SPACE PROGRAM 73 (1997) (observing that until the 1980s, “many military leaders in all of 
the services still viewed the four primary defense support space missions as something out-
side the ‘real world’ of Air Force or Navy or Army operations” and that this attitude 
“changed perceptibly [during the First Gulf War] in 1991 when these pre-positioned assets 
in Earth orbit demonstrated forcefully the central role space support now played in military 
operations.”). 
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principal reason was the geopolitical context of the Cold War, which was 
marked by States’ strong reluctance to “deal with the military aspects of 
space activities” when drafting multilateral treaties.55  
Although this absence of express “hard law” rules that would extend the 
applicability of the jus in bello to space activities is understandable, its im-
portance should not be overstated. After all, international law is no 
longer56—if it ever was—based on a Lotus-like presumption that without ex-
press constraining rules, States are free to act as they please.57 When States 
extend their activities to a new domain, that domain does not become a law-
less zone.58 Rather, generally applicable rules of international law will follow 
States’ activities to their new locus. A number of relevant examples illustrates 
this point. 
For an instance of a novel technology that postdated some of the cru-
cially relevant law, consider the relationship between nuclear weapons and 
the jus ad bellum. The central international agreement governing the law on 
the use of force, the UN Charter, was drafted at a time when the invention 
of nuclear weapons was still a closely guarded secret.59 Accordingly, the 
Charter did not refer to this type of weapon.60 Nonetheless, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) had little difficulty in holding decades later that the 
                                                                                                                      
55. See Stephan Hobe, Historical Background, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE 
LAW: OUTER SPACE TREATY 1, 14 (Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Kai-Uwe 
Schrogl eds., 2009). 
56. See, e.g., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 404, 478–79, ¶¶ 2–3 
(July 22) (Simma, J., declaration) (arguing that reliance on the Lotus principle “reflects an 
old, tired view of international law” and amounts to an “anachronistic, extremely consen-
sualist vision of international law”). 
57. Cf. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) 
(“Restrictions on the independence of States cannot . . . be presumed”). 
58. See also Stephens & Steer, supra note 49, at 81 (arguing that a conclusion that “space 
is a lawless frontier” would additionally go “against the progressive thrust and reasoning 
underpinning the historic trajectory of IHL”). 
59. Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Verbatim Record CR 
95/25, ¶ 46 (Nov. 3, 1995) (Oral Argument of Berchmans Soedarmanto Kadarisman) (not-
ing that “the framers of the United Nations Charter could not be aware of the threat of 
nuclear weapons”). 
60. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 39–51. 
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Charter provisions “apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons em-
ployed.”61 The fact that the existence of nuclear weapons was not known to 
the drafters of the Charter was irrelevant to the Court’s conclusion.62 
The growing importance of the Internet for virtually all types of human 
behavior and interaction offers another, more recent example. The novel 
environment of cyberspace has posed a similar challenge to the applicability 
of international law. In the 1990s, it was seriously argued that rules designed 
for the “offline world” did not and should not reach into cyberspace.63 Per-
haps the most colorful of such proclamations was the Declaration of the Inde-
pendence of Cyberspace, authored by the libertarian activist John P. Barlow in 
1996.64 Yet, in less than two decades, States from all geographical regions of 
the world expressly affirmed that they considered international law to apply 
to conduct in cyberspace.65 Moreover, this shared view was cemented by a 
                                                                                                                      
61. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, ¶ 39 (July 8) (emphasis added). 
62. See also Stefan Kadelbach, Interpretation of the Charter, in THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 79, 89 (Bruno Simma ed., 3d ed. 2012) (arguing that 
the utility of the Charter travaux is limited given that many problems were not foreseen in 
1945, whereas for others shared meanings have been worked out over time). 
63. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1367 (1996). 
64. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRON-
TIER FOUNDATION (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final. 
html. The “Declaration” is well-worth reading in full. However, just to illustrate its tone, it 
described governments as “weary giants of flesh and steel,” claimed that they “have no 
sovereignty” online, and that their laws amount to “hostile and colonial measures.” Inter-
estingly, twenty years later, Barlow said he “[would] stand by much of the document as 
written.” How John Perry Barlow Views His Internet Manifesto on Its 20th Anniversary, THE ECON-
OMIST (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/international/21690200-internet-
idealism-versus-worlds-realism-how-john-perry-barlow-views-his-manifesto. 
65. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 15, U.N. Doc. A/65/154 (July 
20, 2010) (United Kingdom); U.N. Secretary-General, Developments in the Field of Infor-
mation and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 6, U.N. Doc. 
A/66/152 (July 15, 2011) (Australia); id. at 18 (United States); U.N. Secretary-General, De-
velopments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of Inter-
national Security 18, U.N. Doc. A/68/156 (July 16, 2013) (United Kingdom); U.N. Secre-
tary-General, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security 4, U.N. Doc. A/68/156/Add.1 (Sept. 9, 2013) (Canada); 
id. at 12 (Iran); id. at 15 (Japan); id. at 16–17 (Netherlands); U.N. Secretary-General, Devel-
opments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of Interna-
tional Security 16, U.N. Doc. A/69/112 (June 30, 2014) (Switzerland). 
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2013 consensus report of UN-based experts,66 which in turn, was later en-
dorsed by a UN General Assembly resolution.67 In sum, the novelty of the 
online realm did not make it a domain free from international legal regula-
tion.68 
It is submitted that the same approach should apply, in principle, to State 
conduct in outer space. Admittedly, the initial days of space exploration were 
marked by similarly conservative views, according to which international law 
only applied on earth.69 However, as stated by the leading early space law 
expert Daniel Goedhuis, “[i]nternational law is ‘ipso jure’ applicable extra-ter-
restrially. The relevant rules of international law must be taken to regulate 
international relations wherever such relations take place.”70 At a general 
level, this is now reflected in Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, which 
mandates that States must carry on space activities in accordance with inter-
national law.71 
                                                                                                                      
66. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, transmitted 
by Letter Dated 7 June 2013 from the Chair of the Group Established Pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 66/24 (2011) Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
A/68/98 (June 24, 2013). 
67. G.A. Res. 68/243, pmbl., ¶ 18 (Jan. 9, 2014). 
68. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS 3 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017); see also Kubo Mačák, From Cyber Norms to 
Cyber Rules: Re-Engaging States as Law-Makers, 30 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
877. 
69. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, First Comm., 18th Sess., 1342d mtg. at 163, U.N. Doc. 
A/C.1/SR.1342 (Dec. 2, 1963) (United Arab Republic) (“[T]here [is] as yet no international 
law governing outer space.”); U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.3, at 63 (May 7, 1962) (India) (“we are not sure that international 
law, as we know it on earth, can or ought, mutatis mutandis, to be extended to outer space”)) 
[hereinafter India Statement]. 
70. Daniel Goedhuis, Some Suggestions Regarding the Interpretation and the Imple-
mentation of the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of 13 December 1966, at 3 (Paper 
presented at the Third World Conference on World Peace Through Law, 1967), cited in 
OGUNSOLA O. OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 24 
(1975); see also Bin Cheng, The Extraterrestrial Application of International Law, 18 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBLEMS 132 (1965); MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERI-
ENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 125 (1972, reissued 2010). 
71. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46, art. III 
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, includ-
ing the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and 
security and promoting international cooperation and understanding. 
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Accordingly, the fact that jus in bello rules do not contain an express pro-
vision confirming that they apply to conduct in outer space does not rule out 
such applicability. On the contrary, States are under a specific obligation to 
respect and ensure respect for the jus in bello “in all circumstances” as codified 
in Common Article 1,72 a provision considered to reflect customary interna-
tional law.73 The phrase “in all circumstances” plainly covers those circum-
stances that may not have been foreseen by the drafters, including, it is sub-
mitted, military operations with a nexus to outer space. 
 
B. Peaceful Purposes Objection 
 
Another possible objection is that although international law does extend to 
the conduct of States in outer space, that premise does not cover all subsets 
of international law in the same way. In other words, not all international law 
is equal, and some international law is simply not designed to apply in outer 
space. This objection is based on the argument that all law applicable in 
space, as recognized by the preamble to the space law “constitution,”74 the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty, is predicated on “the common interest of all man-
kind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful 
purposes.”75 Accordingly, because the jus in bello rules govern the conduct of 
                                                                                                                      
It is controversial whether this provision also extends to the jus in bello. After all, that 
body of law is predicated on the assumption that the Article III goals of peace, cooperation, 
and understanding have broken down between the belligerent parties. Moreover, the jus in 
bello is normally understood as operating autonomously from the jus ad bellum, to which 
Article III obviously refers. See, e.g., Bouvier, supra note 38, at 110. Article III may thus be 
reasonably interpreted to extend to peacetime international law (including the jus ad bellum 
rules), but not to the jus in bello. This matter is explored further in Section III.B infra. 
72. See also AP I, supra note 43, pmbl. (“the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 and of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons 
who are protected by those instruments”) (emphasis added). 
73. 1 CIHL, supra note 44, r. 139; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 220 (June 27). 
74. See, e.g., Tanja Masson-Zwaan & Richard Crowther, Legal and Regulatory Issues, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY 657 (Malcolm Macdonald & Viorel 
Badescu eds., 2014). 
75. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46, pmbl. 
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hostilities, which are decidedly non-peaceful in nature, the rules forming this 
body of law should not apply in outer space.76 
In unpacking this objection, it is worthwhile to compare outer space with 
other areas of the global commons that States have likewise committed to 
use for “peaceful purposes.” Here, the legal regimes of the high seas77 and 
Antarctica78 provide the best examples. Of these two, the regime of the high 
seas is the closer, although not perfect, analogy to that of outer space.79 Both 
the high seas and outer space are clearly outside all States’ territorial jurisdic-
tion;80 they are not subject to appropriation by States or individuals;81 and 
they constitute vast, predominantly empty spaces, where prolonged human 
activity outside a manmade vessel is not possible.82 Accordingly, the follow-
ing analysis focusses on the parallels between these two regimes.83 
The analogous provision in the legal framework applicable to the high 
seas is Article 88 (the “peaceful use clause”) of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This Article prescribes that 
the “high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.”84 Although some 
                                                                                                                      
76. See, e.g., India Statement, supra note 69, at 63 (“My delegation cannot contemplate 
any prospect other than that outer space should be a kind of warless world, where all military 
concepts of this earth should be totally inapplicable.”). 
77. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 88, opened for signature Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
78. Antarctic Treaty art. 1, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 
71. 
79. See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 401 (1997); but see infra 
note 92 (noting the existence of some skepticism towards analogies of this kind within the 
relevant scholarship). 
80. UNCLOS, supra note 77, art. 87; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46, art. 1; contra 
Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries art. 3(e) (Bogota Declaration), Dec. 
3, 1976, I.T.U. Doc. WARC-BS 81-E (asserting that the equatorial arc of the geostationary 
orbit is subject to the jurisdiction of equatorial States). The Bogota Declaration was subse-
quently opposed by other States and claims made therein over the geostationary orbit have 
not been successful. See Steven Freeland & Ram Jakhu, Article II, in COLOGNE COMMEN-
TARY ON SPACE LAW, supra note 55, at 44, ¶ 48. 
81. UNCLOS, supra note 77, art. 89; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46, art. 2. 
82. KENNETH KAMLER, SURVIVING THE EXTREMES 12 (2004). 
83. For a comparative analysis of the notion of peaceful purposes in the law of Antarc-
tica and space law, see CHENG, supra note 79, at 247–52. 
84. UNCLOS, supra note 77, art. 88. 
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early Soviet literature did claim that the clause was “to be understood gener-
ally as a prohibition of any military activity” on the high seas,85 this interpre-
tation never gained significant traction. Historically, marine spaces outside 
State jurisdiction have certainly not been considered immune to military ac-
tivity nor to jus in bello regulation. That was expressly recognized in the 1900 
Naval War Code,86 a document described authoritatively as “the starting-
point of a movement for codification of maritime international law.”87 The 
Code stipulated that “[t]he area of maritime warfare comprises the high seas or 
other waters that are under no jurisdiction and the territorial waters of belliger-
ents.”88 This longstanding interpretation was re-endorsed during the drafting 
work on UNCLOS, the clearest statement to that effect coming from the 
United States.89 Additionally, it has been reflected in the widely respected 
1994 San Remo Manual, according to which “hostile actions by naval forces 
may be conducted in, on, or over . . . the high seas.”90 There can, therefore, 
be no doubt that the general legal regime of the high seas does not preclude 
the conducting of military activities, and that the jus in bello applies to such 
activities in spite of the peaceful use clause enshrined in UNCLOS. 
Nevertheless, as stated above, the analogy between the law of outer space 
and the high seas (or indeed other legal regimes) is by definition an imperfect 
one.91 As such, the “analogical approach” has certainly not been universally 
                                                                                                                      
85. Rüdiger Wolfrum, Military Activities on the High Seas: What Are the Impacts of the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea?, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MIL-
LENNIUM 501, 503 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (Vol. 71, U.S. Naval 
War College International Law Studies) (emphasis added); see also id. at 503–05. 
86. U.S. Navy Department, General Orders No. 551, The United States Naval War 
Code of 1900: The Laws and Usages of War at Sea (June 27, 1900), revoked by General Order 
No. 150, Feb. 4, 1904, reprinted in 3 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIS-
CUSSIONS, 1903, at 101 (1904) [hereinafter Naval War Code].  
87. 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 n.4 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 
1970). 
88. Naval War Code, supra note 86, art. 2 (emphasis added). 
89. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1973–82, 4th Sess., 67th 
plen. mtg. ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.67 (Apr. 23, 1976), reprinted in 5 OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 62 
(“The term ‘peaceful purposes’ did not, of course, preclude military activities generally.”). 
90. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CON-
FLICTS AT SEA ¶ 10 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995). 
91. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
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accepted in the literature.92 In fact, since the dawn of the Space Age, it has 
been claimed that space activities are very specific, thus necessitating specific 
solutions, and that “no analogies to air law or sea law should be made.”93 Sim-
ilarly, it is not at all clear that the notion of peaceful purposes has attained 
the status of a general principle of international law that would apply in the 
same way across various domains.94 That is why it needs to be examined in 
the context of military space operations. 
The space law version of the peaceful use clause can be found in Article 
IV(2) of the Outer Space Treaty, which provides that “[t]he Moon and other 
celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for 
peaceful purposes.”95 An authoritative commentary states that this provision “is 
commonly regarded as the focal point in the [Treaty] dealing with the military 
uses of outer space.”96 
It is readily apparent that Article IV(2) does not outlaw all non-peaceful 
activities in outer space. Rather, its scope is restricted to the moon and other 
celestial bodies; it does not address the use of the so-called “empty space” 
between celestial bodies.97 This limitation stands in stark contrast to some 
statements appearing in the Treaty’s travaux préparatoires,98 as well as to other 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, which consistently refer to “outer 
                                                                                                                      
92. See, e.g., Jeffrey Prevost, Law of Outer Space—Summarized, 19 CLEVELAND STATE LAW 
REVIEW 595, 601 (1970) 
Unfortunately, the analogy is more romance than science. The sea, as relates to pertinent 
law, is a surface of two dimensions; space is a three dimensional volume within which man 
operates. Time itself contracts; gravity ceases. The shortest distance between two points is 
a curved line; navigation, as used on earth, is meaningless. 
93. Hobe, supra note 55, ¶ 13 (attributing this view to an ad hoc committee of the UN 
General Assembly convened in May 1958). 
94. Alexander Proelß, Peaceful Purposes ¶ 22, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Nov. 2010), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780 
199231690/law-9780199231690-e1453. 
95. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46, art. IV(2) (emphasis added). 
96. Kai-Uwe Schrogl & Julia Neumann, Article IV, in COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON 
SPACE LAW, supra note 55, at 70, ¶ 1. 
97. CARL Q. CHRISTOL, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 20 (1982); 
Schrogl & Neumann, supra note 96, at 81–82. 
98. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-
comm., 5th sess., 57th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.57 (July 12, 1966) (“The 
central objective was to ensure that outer space and celestial bodies were reserved exclu-
sively for peaceful activities.”) (statement by Mr. Goldberg, U.S. representative). 
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space,” the “Moon,” and “celestial bodies.”99 Furthermore, military uses of 
outer space have been a common and recurrent feature of State practice both 
before and after the adoption of the Treaty.100  
All this offers additional support to the interpretation that the legal 
framework of space law does not forbid the use of outer space for military 
activities.101 Many such activities do amount to military space operations as 
understood here; and as such, they may occur during armed conflicts.102 In 
sum, although the commitment of States to the use of outer space for peace-
ful purposes may have important legal effects for the relevant jus ad bellum,103 
it does not preclude the applicability of the jus in bello to outer space. 
 
C. Sources Quandary 
 
Accepting that the jus in bello may apply to military space activities leads to 
the question of whether this interim conclusion needs to be qualified de-
pending on the source of the rules being considered. As with public interna-
tional law generally,104 the two main sources of the jus in bello are international 
treaties and customary international law.105 In turn, each legal source poses 
specific problems when applied to outer space. 
                                                                                                                      
99. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46, arts. I–III, V–VII, IX–XI, XIII (noting that 
all articles use the phrase “outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies”); see 
also id., art. V (noting that this article uses the phrase “activities in outer space and on celestial 
bodies”). 
100. Schrogl & Neumann, supra note 96, ¶ 3 (“Military use has been an element of space 
activities since the beginning of the space age.”). 
101. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (mandating that, together with the context of the terms 
of the treaty, their interpretation should take into account subsequent practice in the appli-
cation of the treaty); id., art. 32 (providing that recourse to supplementary means of inter-
pretation, including the travaux préparatoires is permissible). 
102. See supra Part II. 
103. See also Michel Bourbonnière & Ricky J. Lee, Legality of the Deployment of Conventional 
Weapons in Earth Orbit: Balancing Space Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, 18 EUROPEAN JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 873, 874–882 (2007) and particularly id. at 877 (“the norma-
tive nature of the second paragraph of Article IV is that of a jus ad bellum norm”). 
104. HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2014) (stating 
“treaties and custom are the two main sources of law”). 
105. In addition to treaties and custom, the third principal source of international law 
is general principles of law, as recognized by Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. However, 
in the context of the jus in bello “the regulatory density through treaties and customary law 
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1. Treaties 
 
For treaties, the starting point as to their applicability is Article 29 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which holds that 
a treaty is normally binding upon each party in its entire territory.106 This 
basic rule on the territorial scope of treaties is subject to the important qual-
ification that a particular treaty may apply more narrowly or, indeed, more 
broadly, if that intention “appears from the treaty or is otherwise estab-
lished.”107 Outer space obviously falls outside the territory of any State.108 In 
this regard, it is comparable to the high seas.109 Notably, a leading commen-
tary to the VCLT opines that it is indeed necessary to establish the relevant 
intention of the parties if a treaty’s application is to extend to “such areas as 
the high seas.”110 
Therefore, the correct interpretive approach will differ depending on the 
treaty in question. On the one hand, it is clear from the full title of the Hague 
Regulations that its provisions were to apply solely to the land territory of 
the parties.111 As such, no intention to extend its applicability qua treaty law112 
to sea or air warfare can be presumed, and this holds a fortiori with regard to 
military space operations. To some extent, intra-territorial effects of such 
operations may bring them within the scope of the Hague Regulations. By 
way of example, the use of space assets to cause the treacherous death or 
                                                                                                                      
is such that (express) and exclusive resort to general principles of law does not occur fre-
quently.” Jann Kleffner, Sources of the Law of Armed Conflict, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 71, 81 (Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack eds., 2016).  
106. VCLT, supra note 101, art. 29 (“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty 
or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire terri-
tory.”). 
107. Id. 
108. CHENG, supra note 79, at 36 (stating that “the sky is literally the limit of national 
sovereignty”). 
109. Id. at 390 (“Under general international law, prima facie, outer space as such is, 
like the high seas, extra commercium.”). But see supra text accompanying note 92 (noting some 
scholarly opposition against drawing general analogies between outer space and the high 
seas). 
110. MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF TREATIES 391–92 (2009). 
111. See supra note 41. 
112. But see infra Section III.C.2 (concerning the applicability of the 1907 Hague Regu-
lations as customary international law). 
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injury of enemy combatants on land would render the operation unlawful 
under Article 23(b).113 
On the other hand, the scope of the Geneva Conventions must be inter-
preted in light of their first article, which, as previously indicated, prescribes 
that States must respect and ensure respect for the Conventions “in all cir-
cumstances.”114 Although the Conventions lack a general provision specify-
ing their territorial scope, “all circumstances” should be interpreted as ex-
tending their applicability to any location where an armed conflict may occur. 
This is generally accepted with regard to areas outside the territory of the 
belligerent States such as the high seas.115 With the extension of human ac-
tivities to outer space, the same interpretation should be endorsed, and the 
Conventions should be considered to be capable of extraterritorial (or, more 
precisely, extraterrestrial) application to outer space.116 
 
2. Custom 
 
Customary international law poses a different general problem in applying 
the jus in bello to military space operations. As a source of international law, 
custom has a fundamentally retrospective nature. This is because one of the 
well-established conditions for the emergence of customary rules is the pre-
existence of a “constant and uniform” practice.117 However, due to the rela-
tive novelty of the use of space assets in times of armed conflict, State prac-
tice supporting the existing rules of custom is predominantly or exclusively 
                                                                                                                      
113. 1907 Hague Regulations, art. 23(b) (“[I]t is especially forbidden . . . [t]o kill or 
wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.”). 
114. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
115. See, e.g., ERIC DAVID, PRINCIPES DE DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMÉS 256 (2008) (ar-
guing that it is “evident” that the Geneva Conventions govern an IAC involving fighting 
outside a State’s territory, including on the high seas); Katja Schöberl, The Geographical Scope 
of Application of the Conventions, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 67, 
75 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015) (“If enemy combatants were 
taken prisoners on the high seas, they too would benefit from GC III.”). 
116. See also Schöberl, supra note 115, at 74 (“The Conventions’ extraterritorial applica-
tion is supported . . . also as regards . . . outer space.”). 
117. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266, 276 (Nov. 20) (holding 
that custom was legally binding when practiced “in accordance with a constant and uniform 
usage”) (emphasis added); Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment, 
1960 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 40 (Apr. 12) (holding that Portugal had customary right to cross the 
territory of India to reach its colonial enclaves where “constant and uniform practice” had con-
tinued over a prolonged period) (emphasis added).  
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terrestrial in nature. Accordingly, even the detailed ICRC Customary Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law study does not cite evidence of space-based practice 
in support of any of its 161 rules.118 
In the early days of space exploration, leading U.S. and Soviet academics 
argued against any extension of the existing customary rules to outer space. 
Thus, John Cooper claimed in 1961 that “[n]o general customary interna-
tional law exists covering the legal status of outer space.”119 Two years later, 
Petr Ivanovich Lukin wrote that the “international law of outer space can 
find the reliable source of its inception and subsequent development only in 
international agreements.”120 By contrast, today it is no longer seriously dis-
puted that many rules of customary international law applicable specifically 
to outer space activities have evolved.121 Notably, some of these rules corre-
spond to rules enacted in the main space law treaties,122 however, none of 
these customary rules can be fairly described as rules of the jus in bello.123 
Nevertheless, unless a particular rule of custom is expressly (or by its 
nature) limited to a particular domain, it should not automatically be seen as 
inapplicable to a novel domain like outer space. It makes sense that, for ex-
ample, the customary rule prohibiting export of cultural property from oc-
cupied territory by definition would only apply terrestrially.124 However, cus-
tomary rules of the jus in bello largely regulate behavior of the belligerents 
without distinction as to where this conduct takes place. A useful analogy is 
the “law of cyber armed conflict,”125 the body of law that applies to cyber 
operations executed in the context of armed conflict.126 
                                                                                                                      
118. See 2 CIHL, supra note 44. 
119. John C. Cooper, The Rule of Law in Outer Space, 47 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
JOURNAL 23 (1961). 
120. Petr Ivanovich Lukin, To the Question of the Sources of Space Law, 1963 QUESTIONS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (in Russian), cited in Vladlen S. Vereshchetin & Gennady M. 
Danilenko, Custom as a Source of International Law of Outer Space, 13 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW 
22, 26 (1985). 
121. I. H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & V. KOPAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE 
LAW 9–12 (3d rev. ed. 2008). 
122. Peter Malanczuk, Space Law as a Branch of International Law, 1994 NETHERLANDS 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 159. 
123. CHENG, supra note 79, at 525. 
124. See 1 CIHL, supra note 44, r. 41. 
125. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 68, pt. IV. 
126. See id. at 375, r. 80 (“Cyber operations executed in the context of an armed conflict 
are subject to the law of armed conflict.”). 
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The identification of these rules was a task undertaken by an interna-
tional group of experts participating in the Tallinn Manual project under the 
auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
between 2009 and 2017.127 The manual resulting from this project stated, 
“because State cyber practice is mostly classified and publicly available ex-
pressions of opinio juris are sparse, it is difficult to definitively identify any 
cyber-specific customary international law.”128 However, the experts agreed 
that existing (non-cyber-specific) norms of customary international law ap-
ply to cyber operations and saw their task as the determination of “how such 
law applies in the cyber context.”129 To date no State has expressly objected 
to this methodology. Indeed, on the contrary, over fifty States voluntarily 
chose to submit their observations on the draft second edition of the Manual 
during the so-called Hague Process.130 The same approach should be under-
taken with respect to the extension of customary jus in bello rules to outer 
space. While their applicability in general should be accepted, the key issue 
is precisely how such rules would apply in a specific context. 
Finally, if it is accepted that, in principle, customary jus in bello rules apply 
in outer space, this may alleviate the problem of limited applicability of some 
of the relevant treaty law. It is well established, for instance, that the Hague 
Regulations have acquired the force of customary international law.131 
Hence, even if their rules may not apply qua treaty law, they would still gov-
ern the conduct of belligerents mutatis mutandis by way of customary law.132 
                                                                                                                      
127. By way of disclosure, the present author served as a peer reviewer in the second 
phase of the project.  
128. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 68, at 3. 
129. Id. 
130. See Over 50 States Consult Tallinn Manual 2.0, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DE-
FENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (CCDCOE) (Feb. 2, 2016), ccdcoe.org/over-50-states-
consult-tallinn-manual-20.html. 
131. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 497 (1948) (stating that “by 1939 these rules laid down in the 
[fourth Hague] Convention were recognised by all civilised nations, and were regarded as 
being declaratory of the laws and customs of war”); Prosecutor v. Prlić; Case No. IT-04-74-
A, Judgement, ¶ 317 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2017) (noting 
that “the Hague Regulations . . . constitute customary international law”). 
132. In addition to the Hague Regulations, another prominent subset of the jus in bello 
that may benefit from this interpretive approach is the law of targeting as codified in Addi-
tional Protocol I. Article 49(3) limits the applicability of the relevant section of that instru-
ment “to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the civilian population, individual 
civilians or civilian objects on land.” Although this wording plainly does not include “space 
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This interpretation would explain why States have on occasion referred to 
the Hague Regulations in connection with space activities, notwithstanding 
that instrument’s ostensible limitation to land warfare.133 
 
IV. SPECIFIC DIMENSIONS OF APPLICABILITY OF THE JUS IN BELLO 
 
A. Material Scope of Application 
 
The material scope of application of the jus in bello determines the types of 
situations to which it applies. It is true that some jus in bello rules also apply 
in peacetime,134 such as the obligations to disseminate the text of the Geneva 
Conventions,135 to prosecute grave breaches,136 and to review new weap-
ons.137 Still, these are exceptions, and the application of the vast majority of 
the rules is contingent on the existence of a situation qualifying as either an 
IAC or a NIAC. 
 
                                                                                                                      
warfare” nor earth-based attacks affecting persons or objects in space, some scholars have 
argued that the provision should be interpreted more extensively to bring some military 
space operations within its purview. See, e.g., Michel Bourbonnière, Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites or Ius in Bello Satellitis, 9 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT 
AND SECURITY LAW 43, 49–50 (2004); Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Op-
erations in Space, 10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW ONLINE 89, 115–
16 (2006). However, it is submitted that this debate is largely academic, given that most 
targeting rules in the Protocol are considered to reflect customary international law. Hence, 
even if they may not apply to space operations qua treaty law, they would still apply by way 
of custom. See also WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 361–62 (2012) (opin-
ing that “customary principles and rules of targeting . . . apply to any activities from, in, or 
to space that may directly or indirectly affect civilians or civilian objects on land”). 
133. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-
comm., 2d sess., 17th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.17 (June 27, 1963) (“Provi-
sions of the Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
outlawed spying, and satellites used for the collection of intelligence material would be 
spies.”) (statement of Mr. Fedorenko, representative of the USSR). 
134. See also Henri Meyrowitz, The Functions of the Law of War in Peacetime, 26 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 77 (1986). 
135. GC I, supra note 42, art. 47; GC II, supra note 42, art. 48; GC III, supra note 42, 
art. 127; GC IV, supra note 42, art. 144. 
136. GC I, supra note 42, art. 49; GC II, supra note 42, art. 50; GC III, supra note 42, 
art. 129; GC IV, supra note 42, art. 146. 
137. AP I, supra note 43, art. 36. 
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1. International Armed Conflicts 
 
Defined in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, the IAC concept 
is well understood in international law.138 Simply put, if there is a “resort to 
armed force between states,” the law of IAC applies.139 In relation to military 
space operations, the notion of IAC poses few difficulties. A kinetic attack 
by one State against another, either utilizing space assets or one directed 
against such assets (such as the Ghost Fleet scenario described above140), 
would amount to the commencement of hostilities between the two States. 
As such, it would meet the definition of an IAC. 
This opens the question of whether there is a minimum requirement of 
intensity of violence in relation to IACs. One can imagine an isolated inci-
dent, whereby a State would cause very limited damage to either the ground-
based space infrastructure or a space object controlled by the enemy State. 
Some writers, supported by several national military manuals and the ICRC, 
take the view that there is no such minimum requirement, stating that as 
soon as there is hostile action between two parties, the law of armed conflict 
will apply.141 Others have argued that such one-off incidents—typically bor-
der clashes or minor naval skirmishes—have not always been treated as IACs 
in State practice.142 
                                                                                                                      
138. See also ROBERT KOLB, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 94 (2014) (“The criteria [Common Article 2] contains reflect [customary 
international law] criteria for the applicability of IHL in IAC.”). 
139. Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995). 
140. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
141. See, e.g., RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 250 (2002); ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 101 (2008); Andrew Clapham, The Concept of Interna-
tional Armed Conflict, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 115, 
at 3, 16; see also DOD MANUAL, supra note 36, § 3.4.2; FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
(GERMANY), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL ¶ 203 (2013); INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CON-
VENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE 
WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶ 218 (2016) [hereinafter ICRC 
COMMENTARY GC I]. 
142. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 48 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 
2008); Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War and the Notion of Armed 
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The better view is that such situations should be seen as IACs in spite of 
their low intensity and the inconsistencies in State practice. This because the 
modern law of armed conflict is based on a material conception of war, 
which is free from subjective considerations and does not depend on States’ 
acknowledgement of the existence of an armed conflict.143 The variation in 
practice can be explained by reasons of convenience or practicality. If a mi-
nor clash is resolved rapidly and not followed by further hostilities, States 
have little to gain by expressly recognizing the existence of an armed con-
flict.144 However, when an isolated incident did result in lingering conse-
quences, such as the detention of the pilot of a U.S. aircraft shot down by 
Syria in 1983, the one-off nature of the incident did not stop the United 
States from characterizing it as an IAC.145 Therefore, it is submitted that if a 
military space operation amounts to a resort to force between two States, it 
triggers an IAC, whatever its intensity, duration, or scope. 
 
2. Non-International Armed Conflicts 
 
Today the vast majority of armed conflicts are non-international in nature.146 
None of these conflicts were triggered by a military space operation; how-
ever, it is certainly conceivable that such operations can augment existing 
NIACs.147 Currently, military space capabilities are held almost exclusively by 
                                                                                                                      
Conflict—A Tentative Conceptualization, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 95, 
101 (2009). 
143. See LOTHAR KOTZSCH, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (1956). 
144. See NOAM ZAMIR, CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW 54 (2017) (noting that, for diplomatic reasons, States may wish to avoid esca-
lating a situation by referring to it as an armed conflict). 
145. Telegram 348126 from U.S. Department of State to American Embassy at Da-
mascus (Dec. 8, 1983), reprinted in 3 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981–1988, at 3456–57 (1995). Hays Parks, who was then Special 
Assistant for Law of War Matters to the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army, later 
reported that “[u]pon receipt of that demarché, the Syrians complied” with the U.S. request 
to provide prisoner of war protection for the captured pilot. W. Hays Parks, Special Forces’ 
Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 493, 500 n.11 
(2003).  
146. Marie Allansson, Erik Melander & Lotta Themnér, Organized Violence, 1989–2016, 
54 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 574, 576 (2017). 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 31–35 for the distinction between these two 
types of operations. 
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a small club of space-faring States.148 If engaged in a NIAC, these countries 
may rely on their space assets, for example, to improve precision targeting 
by ground and air forces. Conversely, armed groups could attempt to jam a 
State’s satellite signals, thus reducing their adversary’s combat effectiveness. 
Both types of conduct would qualify as military space operations as under-
stood in this article. However, because the criteria for the existence of a 
NIAC under international law are more demanding than those for IACs, 
either activity, if undertaken outside an existing conflict, is unlikely to trigger 
a NIAC. 
Although Common Article 3 does not contain an express definition of a 
NIAC, its interpretation in modern case law and State practice confirms that 
it implies the twofold requirements of minimum organization and inten-
sity.149 First, the non-State party to the conflict must be militarily organized, 
the indicators of which include responsible command, adherence to military 
discipline and the capability to respect the jus in bello.150 This means that de-
structive hostile activities by a private actor, such as a space technology com-
pany, would not trigger the applicability of the jus in bello unless it was orga-
nized and structured in a manner similar to that of an armed group.151 With 
respect to armed groups engaged in hostile space operations, the criterion of 
minimum organization would apply in the same manner as it does to groups 
engaged in terrestrial conflicts.152 
Second, the hostilities must surpass a certain level of intensity.153 To use 
a terrestrial example, this criterion would be met if a State’s police forces 
were no longer capable of dealing with the situation, and therefore the mili-
tary forces would have to be mobilized in order to defeat the armed group.154 
                                                                                                                      
148. See MOLTZ, supra note 9, at 132–40. 
149. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 625 (Sept. 2, 
1998); MARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 109 
(2006); KOLB & HYDE, supra note 141, at 78; SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 167–80 (2012); DOD MANUAL, supra note 36, § 3.4.2.2. 
150. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 89–90, 94–134 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005). 
151. I am grateful to Chris Borgen for bringing this scenario to my attention. 
152. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32, 51–52 (Elizabeth Wilms-
hurst ed., 2012). 
153. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 89–90, 135–70. 
154. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Trial Cham-
ber Judgment, ¶ 177 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008). 
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In this regard, a single attack against a State’s space infrastructure would nor-
mally not suffice to trigger a NIAC.155 The victim State would likely interpret 
an incident of this kind as a terrorist act and respond under the law enforce-
ment paradigm.156 However, if, for example, a jamming attack against the 
State’s space systems was followed by large-scale ground-based confronta-
tions resulting in a considerable number of casualties and significant material 
destruction, the situation would qualify as a NIAC irrespective of the fact 
that the “first shot fired” would have been a space operation.157 
 
B. Personal Scope of Application 
 
The personal dimension of applicability of the jus in bello establishes which 
persons are protected by the law and whose activities the law regulates. More 
precisely, this section analyses the passive personal scope of application of the 
relevant law. It does not address what is sometimes referred to as the active 
personal scope, that is, who is bound by the law and on what grounds.158 
In this regard, the jus in bello is based on a fundamental distinction be-
tween combatants and non-combatants, a distinction that permeates the en-
tirety of this body of law.159 While persons qualifying as combatants may be 
attacked, this is not the case with respect to persons who do not or who are 
                                                                                                                      
155. Cf. Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-65-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 341 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004) (holding that 
the intensity requirement is “significant in excluding mere cases of civil unrest or single acts 
of terrorism”). 
156. Id.; see also Yuval Shany, The International Struggle against Terrorism—the Law Enforce-
ment Paradigm and the Armed Conflict Paradigm, THE ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE (Sept. 10, 
2008), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/6934. 
157. Cf. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 190 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008) 
[W]hile isolated acts of terrorism may not reach the threshold of armed conflict, when there 
is protracted violence of this type, especially where they require the engagement of the 
armed forces in hostilities, such acts are relevant to assessing the level of intensity with 
regard to the existence of an armed conflict. 
See also Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84bis-T, Judgment, ¶ 394 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2012) (holding that the factors to be taken 
into account in assessing the intensity of the conflict include “the extent of destruction and 
number of casualties caused”). 
158. On the key question as to why the jus in bello binds non-State armed groups, see 
SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 149, at 236–49; YORAM DINSTEIN, NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 63–73 (2014). 
159. 1 CIHL, supra note 44, r. 1. 
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no longer directly participating in hostilities.160 The latter—which includes 
the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, prisoners of war and civilians—are re-
ferred to as “protected persons” and the relevant jus in bello rules guarantee 
them material protection.161 
With respect to military space operations, this means that it is necessary 
to determine the legal status of persons engaged in such activities. The cen-
tral question in that regard is how to classify members of State armed forces 
who are engaged in activities in outer space during an armed conflict. This 
question arises because there is a tension between the role ascribed to such 
persons by the jus in bello and general space law. 
Under the jus in bello, the status of members of the armed forces is clear: 
unless they fall into one of the listed exceptions, such as medical or religious 
personnel, the law classifies them as combatants.162 This qualification carries 
several important consequences. Combatants can be targeted by the enemy 
at all times; they cannot be prosecuted for their mere participation in hostil-
ities and, if captured, they are to be treated as prisoners of war (POWs).163 
Although POWs are subject to extensive protections under the jus in bello,164 
they may lawfully be kept in detention until the close of hostilities,165 which 
may translate into months or even years of internment for individual cap-
tives. 
By contrast, space law prescribes that astronauts are to be regarded by 
all States as “envoys of mankind.”166 Admittedly, there is some doubt as to 
whether this term itself carries specific legal implications, with a leading 
space law commentary describing it as “only a figure of speech.”167 There is 
no question, however, that space law mandates that all States owe certain 
duties to persons so designated. In particular, States must give astronauts “all 
                                                                                                                      
160. AP I, supra note 43, arts. 41(1), 43(2), 48. 
161. See also Kleffner, supra note 31, at 55–56. 
162. AP I, supra note 43, art. 43(2); GC III, supra note 42, art. 33. 
163. EMILY CRAWFORD & ALISON PERT, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 87 
(2015). 
164. See especially GC III, supra note 42, passim; AP I, supra note 43, arts. 43–47, 67(2), 
85(4)(b). 
165. GC III, supra note 42, art. 118. 
166. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46, art. V(1).  
167. Frans Gerhard von der Dunk & Gérardine Meishan Goh, Article V, in COLOGNE 
COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, supra note 55, at 94, ¶ 17. 
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possible assistance”168 in time of need and, if astronauts fall into the hands 
of a third State following an emergency or unintended landing, that State 
must return them, safely and promptly, to the State where their space vehicle 
is registered.169  
Plainly, the two sets of obligations—those under the jus in bello and those 
mandated by space law—are in tension, if not outright conflict. As noted by 
Ramey, “[i]t would simply be incongruous for one person to simultaneously 
constitute a combatant and an ‘envoy of mankind.’”170 Therefore, does the 
personal scope of application of the jus in bello extend to astronauts? 
In order to answer this question, we must look beyond the isolated pro-
visions that may indeed appear incompatible. The tension starts to dissipate 
once the context of these rules is taken into account and the object and pur-
pose of the treaties in which they are contained is considered.171 Rules on 
combatancy, given their grounding in the jus in bello, presume the existence 
of an armed conflict. The category of combatants, then, is plainly designed 
to cover those persons who materially contribute to the efforts of the bellig-
erents to prosecute an existing armed conflict. Conversely, the existing treaty 
framework of space law has been created to govern space exploration and 
peaceful uses of outer space.172 Astronauts can, accordingly, be seen as “en-
voys of mankind,” and benefit from the concomitant obligations of third 
States only when not engaged in hostile actions. This interpretation is sup-
ported by the travaux préparatoires of the Rescue and Return Agreement, 
which records the statements of many delegations emphasizing the human-
itarian motives underpinning the draft treaty and that it was meant to cover 
astronauts while carrying out activities in the context of peaceful space ex-
ploration.173  
                                                                                                                      
168. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46, art. V(1); see also Rescue and Return Agreement, 
supra note 46, art. 2 (using a slightly different formulation, according to which the State in 
question “shall immediately take all possible steps to rescue them and render them all nec-
essary assistance”). 
169. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46, art. V(1); Rescue and Return Agreement, supra 
note 46, art. 4. 
170. Ramey, supra note 49, at 152. 
171. VCLT, supra note 101, art. 31(1). 
172. von der Dunk & Goh, supra note 167, at 101. 
173. See especially U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal 
Subcomm., Special Sess., 86th mtg. at 4 (Soviet Union), 10 (Japan), 12 (India), 14 (France), 
15 (Hungary), 17 (Canada), 18 (Bulgaria), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.86 (Feb. 9, 1968); 
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Therefore, the personal applicability of the jus in bello extends to astro-
nauts, but the mere fact of the existence of an armed conflict does not nec-
essarily convert them to combatants, even if they formally belong to the 
armed forces of one of the belligerent parties. It has been suggested in this 
regard that non-belligerent astronauts would come under a “modified hors de 
combat concept.”174 However, the term hors de combat is well defined in the jus 
in bello and it would be inadvisable to reconceptualize it beyond the currently 
accepted categories, all of which presume some kind of incapacitation of 
persons previously eligible for combatant status.175 Any attempt to redefine 
this longstanding legal term would risk decreasing its effectiveness and un-
dermining the current “interlocking and comprehensive system” established 
by the existing rules.176 
The better view is that astronauts maintain their status as “envoys of 
mankind” and the concomitant rights unless and until they engage in con-
duct with a material nexus to an armed conflict.177 If and when they do so,178 
                                                                                                                      
U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Special Sess., 
87th mtg. at 10 (Mexico), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.87 (Feb. 2, 1968). 
174. Stephens & Steer, supra note 49, at 87. 
175. See AP I, supra note 43, art. 41(2) 
A person is hors de combat if: (a) He is in the power of an adverse Party; (b) He clearly ex-
presses an intention to surrender; or (c) He has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise 
incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself; pro-
vided that in any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to 
escape. 
176. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1603 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTO-
COLS]. 
177. This standard is analogical to the notion of “acts harmful to the enemy” relied on 
by several rules of the law of armed conflict in order to define when special protection 
guaranteed to specific categories of persons or objects shall cease: see, e.g., GC I, supra note 
42, art. 21; GC II, supra note 42, art. 34; GC IV, supra note 42, art. 19; AP I, supra note 43, 
arts. 13, 23(3), 65, and 67(1)(e). I am grateful to Laurent Gisel for drawing this analogy to 
my attention. 
178. Cf. ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF 
THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 200 (Jean 
S. Pictet ed., 1952) (noting that specific conduct qualifies as an “act harmful to the enemy” 
if and when its “purpose or effect . . . is to harm the adverse Party, by facilitating or impeding 
military operations”). 
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their conduct then eo ipso negates their original status179 and activates the jus 
in bello rules according to which they are to be seen as combatants and may 
thereafter be targeted by the enemy.180 This interpretation is consistent with 
the goals underpinning both bodies of law and provides a practical resolution 
to the apparent normative tension. It also reflects existing State practice, 
which has acknowledged that non-hostile military activities of astronauts be-
longing to the armed forces of an adversary are unobjectionable and do not 
affect their status.181 
 
C. Temporal Scope of Application 
 
The temporal scope of application of the jus in bello ordinarily coincides with 
its material scope.182 In other words, the law begins to apply the moment the 
criteria for the existence of an armed conflict are met.183 However, physical 
attributes of outer space pose specific problems for the applicability of the 
law developed for terrestrial conflicts, because time can appear to pass more 
slowly due to the great distances involved in space warfare.  
In terrestrial combat, the impact of a physical attack normally material-
izes almost instantaneously after initiation of the attack. By contrast, an 
earth-to-space kinetic attack will be underway for up to several hours before 
its impact is felt. That is how long it takes a modern direct ascent ASAT 
                                                                                                                      
179. See also von der Dunk & Goh, supra note 167, at 101 (stating that “threats to na-
tional security . . . might well deprive astronauts of offending member States of their accrued 
rights under the Outer Space Treaty”). 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 162–65. 
181. See, e.g., U.S. Military Space Activities, supra note 7, at 5 (stating, with respect to a 
Soviet astronaut engaged in acts of observation of the earth from outer space, that it is 
impossible “to distinguish between Major Titov as a space traveller and as an officer of the 
Soviet Air Force” and that the United States “cannot perceive any reason to object” to such 
activities); see also U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-
comm., 4th sess., 46th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.46 (Nov. 30, 1965) (state-
ment by Mr. Yankov, representative of Bulgaria) (stating that “the phrase ‘envoys of man-
kind’ could not be interpreted as covering astronauts engaged in military activities which 
were a threat to world peace” and that “it was not possible to suggest that a State had a legal 
obligation to return the personnel of a spacecraft which had been engaged in military activ-
ities against that State and which was a threat to peace”). 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 1354–37 for some exceptions to this rule. 
183. Jann K. Kleffner, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: General Issues, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 35, 49 (Terry 
D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2d ed. 2015). 
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weapon to reach satellites in the geosynchronous orbit (approximately 
36,000 kilometers above mean sea level).184 By way of comparison, a modern 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) takes thirty minutes or less to reach 
almost any place on earth.185 The launch of an ASAT weapon may be de-
tected by missile warning satellites, but there would still be considerable time 
between launch and impact. 
This poses a practical question, namely when exactly does the law begin 
to apply in such situations? Is it at the moment the weapon is launched, or 
only hours later once it has reached its target, and then only if the target is 
hit? There are few parallels in terrestrial warfare, the most apparent of which 
is the firing of an ICBM. However, perhaps because of the relatively short 
time that it takes an ICBM to reach its target, the issue has largely been left 
unaddressed in modern scholarship.186 
The key to the answer is in the definition of IAC—“any . . . armed con-
flict which may arise between two or more” States.187 In other words, as soon 
as there is hostile action by one State against another State, the law will ap-
ply.188 It is submitted that the launch of an anti-satellite weapon against an-
other State’s space assets amounts to hostile action against that State. This 
conclusion is not affected by the reaction of the victim State, including pos-
sible evasive maneuvers of its satellite that might prevent any destructive 
impact altogether.189 If the attempted attack is not followed by any belligerent 
                                                                                                                      
184. Brian Weeden, Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-Satellite 
Testing in Space, THE SPACE REVIEW (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.thespacereview.com/arti-
cle/2473/1. 
185. DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CENTER, U.K. MINISTRY OF DE-
FENCE, THE UK MILITARY SPACE PRIMER ¶ 311, at 3–5 (2010), https://www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33691/SpacePrimerFinalWeb-
Version.pdf. 
186. Cf. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009), 
http://ihlresearch.org/amw/HPCR%20Manual.pdf [hereinafter AMW MANUAL]. Despite 
its stated goal to present a “methodical restatement of existing international law on air and 
missile warfare the AMW Manual does not discuss this issue either in its “black-letter rules” 
or in the detailed commentary thereto. Id. at 2. 
187. GC I, supra note 42, art. 2; GC II, supra note 42, art. 2; GC III, supra note 42, art. 
2; GC IV, supra note 42, art. 2; see also supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
188. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
189. Cf. Weeden, supra note 184 (“Given this lengthy flight time, it is much easier for a 
target satellite in GEO to detect the attack and possibly maneuver to avoid the intercept . . 
. .”). 
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conduct by either party, the applicability of the jus in bello would be very brief, 
but it would still have materialized. 
By contrast, a single attack of this type is unlikely to bring about the 
applicability of the law of NIAC. As discussed above, the threshold require-
ment of intensity raises the bar of necessary violence above one-off inci-
dents.190 However, it is not so much the passage of time but the intensity of 
hostilities that determines the existence of a NIAC.191 The peculiarities of 
launching kinetic ASAT weapons thus do not affect the applicability of the 
law beyond the analysis already presented. 
 
D. Geographic Scope of Application 
 
How wide (or, more precisely, how high) is the geographic reach of the jus in 
bello? We have seen that there is no general bar on its applicability to outer 
space. Moreover, this issue poses few problems for the applicability of the 
law to IACs. The reference to the “territory of a High Contracting Party” in 
Common Article 2, although certainly ground-focused, operates only as an 
add-on to the earlier definitions of “declared war” and “any other armed 
conflict” by extending the applicability of the law to occupied territories. As a 
matter of principle, the law of IAC applies to the conduct of hostilities be-
tween two or more States, wherever it takes place.192 Despite some learned 
opinion to the contrary, this must therefore also include outer space.193 In-
deed, this view has been expressly confirmed in the authoritative proclama-
tions of some States.194 
The question of geographic scope of application poses a considerably 
greater challenge for the law of NIAC. The central provision of this law, 
                                                                                                                      
190. See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text. 
191. Cf. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (“The criterion of protracted armed violence 
has . . . been interpreted . . . as referring more to the intensity of the armed violence than to 
its duration”). 
192. But see supra notes 112, 131–33 and accompanying text for the specific case of the 
1907 Hague Regulations. 
193. But see Kleffner, supra note 31, at 56 (omitting outer space from the list of domains 
in which military operations may be carried out in IACs). 
194. See, e.g., DOD MANUAL, supra note 36, § 14.10.2.2; GERMAN NAVY, COM-
MANDER’S HANDBOOK: LEGAL BASES FOR THE OPERATIONS OF NAVAL FORCES ¶ 79 
(2002), http://usnwc.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=2998104. 
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Common Article 3, expressly speaks of an “armed conflict not of an inter-
national character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties.” Similarly, according to the settled case law of the ad hoc criminal 
tribunals, the geographical scope of the jus in bello is the entirety of the territory 
of the State where the hostilities are taking place.195 Even if one accepts a 
broad understanding of the notion of “territory,” which would include the 
land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, and national airspace of a State, 
this understanding would still not extend to outer space. 
Yet, the notion of NIAC has undergone evolution, particularly since the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. A number of conflicts, which did not 
feature States on opposite sides but which did cross international borders, 
have been classified as NIACs, thus defying the intra-territorial conceptual-
ization of this notion. For example, the Afghan Taliban has operated from 
Pakistan’s territory in its conflict with the government of Afghanistan,196 and 
Colombian armed forces have fought the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia in Ecuadorian territory.197 The United States in particular takes the 
                                                                                                                      
195. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 635 (Sept. 2, 
1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 182–
83 (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 101–102 
(Dec. 6, 1999); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 283 (Jan. 27, 
2000); Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 101 (June 7, 2001); 
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, ¶ 367 (May 15, 2003). 
196. See, e.g., Aerial Drone Deployment on 4 October 2010 in Mir Ali/Pakistan, 157 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 722, 742 (Germany, Federal Prosecutor General, Decision 
to Terminate Proceedings 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/07/german-federal-prosecutor-general-decision-drone-strike-pakistan.pdf (finding 
that “the Afghan Taliban’s use of the FATA region as a haven and staging area has evidently 
caused the Afghan conflict to ‘spill over’ onto this particular part of Pakistan’s national 
territory”). 
197. See, e.g., Communique, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ecuador, Ecuadorian Govern-
ment Protests Assassination of Raul Reyes in Ecuador (Mar. 1, 2008), http://ecuador-ris-
ing.blogspot.com/2008/03/ecuadorian-government-protests.html (rejecting “the presence 
of Colombian irregular groups in the country” and “reiterat[ing] its firm decision not to 
allow the territory of the nation to be used by others to carry out military operations or to 
be used as a base of operations, as part of the Colombian conflict”), cited in Felicity Szesnat 
& Annie R. Bird, Colombia, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CON-
FLICTS, supra note 152, at 203, 217 n.114. Szesnat and Bird note that this statement “could 
be interpreted to mean that Ecuador view[ed] the conflict as being a non-international 
armed conflict solely between Colombia and FARC.” Id. 
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view that the characterization of a situation as a NIAC depends on the status 
of the actors, not the geography of the fighting.198 
Accordingly, we should not read too much into the wording of Common 
Article 3. On close inspection, it is clear that the provision does not specifi-
cally mandate that the law should apply solely intra-territorially. The wording 
“occurring in the territory” reflects the historical fact that before 1949, con-
flicts between a State and a non-State armed group, or those between several 
such groups, were practically always confined to the territory of a single 
State.199 However, at the time Additional Protocol II was being drafted in 
the 1970s, the question of whether to limit its application ratione loci in any 
way was addressed—and the drafters decided against it.200 In the words of 
the authoritative ICRC Commentary, this was because “the applicability of the 
Protocol follows from a criteria [sic] related to persons, and not to places.”201 
The same interpretation should be used with respect to the applicability 
of the law of NIAC in general. In other words, those rules apply to the con-
duct of persons with a nexus to the conflict, irrespective of the “places” in 
which such persons acted and where the effect of their conduct may occur.202 
This broad interpretation of the geographical scope of the jus in bello accords 
with the teleological purpose underpinning this body of law, namely the pro-
tection of victims of war.203 The utilization of military space operations and 
the extension of combat to outer space should not rule out the protections 
and legal certainty guaranteed by the jus in bello. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
With the increasing use of space assets for military purposes, understanding 
the legal framework applicable to military uses of outer space is becoming 
                                                                                                                      
198. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–30 (2006); DOD MANUAL, supra note 36, 
§ 17.1.1.2. 
199. See ICRC COMMENTARY GC I, supra note 141, art. 3, ¶ 455 n.169. 
200. 8 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (1974–1977), at 211, ¶¶ 47–48 (1978). 
201. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 176, ¶ 4490.  
202. See Louise Arimatsu, Territory, Boundaries and the Law of Armed Conflict, 12 YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 157, 189 (2009); SIVAKUMARAN, supra 
note 149, at 251–52. 
203. See AP II, supra note 43, pmbl., ¶ 3 (“[e]mphasizing the need to ensure a better 
protection for the victims of [non-international] armed conflicts”). 
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ever more important. This author shares Bill Boothby’s hope that States re-
nounce as unacceptable all acts of hostility in outer space.204 However, his-
torical experience shows that whenever humankind unlocked a new domain, 
it soon found ways to utilize it for war. 
Fortunately, constraints on warfare prescribed by the jus in bello as the 
body of international law applicable in times of armed conflict do reach be-
yond terrestrial bounds. This article has shown that none of the general ob-
jections that could be raised against such applicability is particularly convinc-
ing. This conclusion is consistent with the emerging practice of States and 
the statements of relevant actors, such as the ICRC. In fact, to the extent the 
legal ramifications of space warfare have been considered at all, there seems 
to be agreement that the jus in bello follows hostilities to outer space.205 
At the same time, the question of whether the law of war applies to outer 
space should not be conflated with the separate question of whether war in 
outer space can be justified. Acknowledging that the law governs a certain 
type of conduct does not legitimate that conduct.206 Quite the contrary, re-
strictions mandated by the jus in bello serve to constrain the behavior of bel-
ligerents during armed conflict. Moreover, even if the prospect of armed 
conflict in space cannot be ruled out entirely, it should at least be moderated 
by the limitations imposed by the law. However, even if the general applica-
bility of the jus in bello to military space operations is accepted, several legal 
questions remain unresolved. 
This article has classified some of these challenges by the specific dimen-
sions of applicability: material, personal, temporal, and geographic. It has 
                                                                                                                      
204. Boothby, supra note 19, at 214. 
205. See, e.g., DOD MANUAL, supra note 36, § 14.10.2.2 (“[L]aw of war treaties and the 
customary law of war are understood to regulate the conduct of hostilities, regardless of 
where they are conducted, which would include the conduct of hostilities in outer space.”); 
Weapons: ICRC Statement to the United Nations, 2015, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
RED CROSS (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/weapons-icrc-statement-
united-nations-2015 (noting that “any hostile use of outer space in armed conflict—that is, 
any use of means and methods of warfare in, from, to or through outer space—must comply 
with IHL”). 
206. Cf. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN-
ITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 40 (2015), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-con-
temporary-armed-conflicts (“[A]sserting that IHL applies to cyber warfare is not an encour-
agement to militarize cyberspace and should not, in any way, be understood as legitimizing 
cyber warfare.”). 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2018 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
shown that military space operations may trigger international armed con-
flicts and, in specific circumstances, non-international armed conflicts. It has 
proposed a solution to the problem of parallel personal applicability of the 
jus in bello and international space law to military astronauts. It has argued 
that, with respect to protracted space operations, the temporal scope of ap-
plication of the law commences at the moment of the first hostile action—
not after the impact of such conduct is felt. Finally, it has proposed an inter-
pretive approach moving away from restricting the law ratione loci and to-
wards the criterion of nexus with an ongoing conflict. 
Accordingly, the analysis in this article provides ample ammunition 
against those who might deny, as Baxter had warned, that the jus in bello ap-
plies at all.207 It confirms that the jus in bello applies in general to space oper-
ations and it clarifies the situations, persons, times, and places to which it 
applies. In sum, the law does not fall silent in times of war, not even in times 
of Silent War. 
 
                                                                                                                      
207. Baxter, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
